My research examines how governments organize expertise and how institutional rules shape political decisions. I work at the intersection of political economy, public policy, and comparative politics, with a second research program on elections and collective choice. Across these areas, I ask how institutional design affects information, incentives, representation, and political compromise.

Politics and Political Economy of Expertise

My central research program studies the institutions through which governments produce, select, and authorize expert knowledge, including advisory commissions, scientific advisory committees, and public inquiries. Rather than treating expertise as a fixed input into policymaking, I examine how institutional design influences which knowledge is produced, whose advice is heard, and what governments are subsequently able to know and justify.

This research includes comparative work on Nordic advisory systems and COVID-19 scientific advisory committees. Our article on the use of ad hoc scientific advisory committees during the pandemic received the 2025 Duncan Black Prize from the Public Choice Society. In 2025, the Scottish Parliament commissioned me to prepare a comparative report on the regulatory frameworks and use of public inquiries in Sweden and Norway.

Current projects in this area examine:

• Competition, compromise, and bias in policy advisory commissions
• The control–information tradeoff in the design of advisory systems
• Institutional change in Swedish commissions of inquiry
• The organization of scientific expertise in pandemic policymaking

Elections and Collective Choice

A second strand of my research uses formal models and laboratory experiments to study how electoral institutions shape participation, information, and strategic behavior.

My current work examines why voters stop ranking candidates in ranked-choice elections. It distinguishes deliberate strategic truncation from incomplete awareness of candidates and possible election outcomes. Related projects study bundled elections, campaign contributions, candidate entry, and the strategic use of campaign war chests.

Public Management and Institutional Change

A newer strand of my research examines performance management and administrative reform. This work studies how reformers seek to alter the relationship between executive control, administrative capacity, and institutional accountability—and why apparently disruptive reforms may represent attempts to implement a distinct model of government rather than a series of unrelated actions.

Methods

I use game theory, statistical modelling, laboratory and survey experiments, comparative case studies, and mixed-method institutional analysis. This methodological range allows me to study both the strategic incentives created by political institutions and how those institutions operate in practice.

View my publications on Google Scholar or download my academic CV.